DETAIN: To retain as the possession of personalty. First Nat. Bank v. Yocom, 96 Or. 438, 189 P. 220, 221.
To arrest, to check, to delay, to hinder, to hold, or keep in custody, to retard, to re strain from proceeding, to stay, to stop. People v. Smith, 17 Cal.App.2d 468, 62 P.2d 436, 438. (Blacks Law 4th Ed, Pg 535)
ARREST: To deprive a person of his liberty by legal authority. Taking, under real or assumed authority, custody of another for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or civil demand. Ex parte Sherwood, 29 Tex.App. 334, 15 S.W. 812. Physical seizure of person by arresting officer or submission to officer's authority and control is necessary to constitute an "arrest." Thompson v. Boston Pub. Co., 285 Mass. 344, 189 N.E. 210, 213. It is a restraints however slight, on another's liberty to come and go. Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga.App. 104, 155 S.E. 112.
It is the taking, seizing or detaining the person of another, touching or putting hands upon him in the execution of process, or any act indicating an intention to arrest. U. S. v. Benner, Bald. 234, 239, Fed.Cas.No.14,568; State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. in and for Cascade County, 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000, 1001; Hoppes v. State, 105 P.2d 433, 439, 70 Okl.Cr. 179.(Blacks Law 4th Ed, Pg 140)
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.
US v. Mendenhall
The Third Circuit found that an individual’s lawful possession of a firearm in a crowded place did not justify a search or seizure.
United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3rd Cir. 2000)
"Mr. St. John’s lawful possession of a loaded firearm in a crowded place could not, by itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory detention."
St. John v. McColley
"The mere presence of firearms does not create exigent circumstances."
State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052.
[WI Court of Appeals]
Detentions and Arrests, info and definitions by cowboyridn
Detention descriptions, consensual and when to walk away. An informational read
3 Different levels of Police/Citizen encounters Explained
4th and 5th Amendment Resources by user Citizen
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1027378.html
The only fact that saves the officer's stop of DeBerry, in my opinion, is the fact that it is unlawful in Illinois to carry a concealed weapon.
The tipster informed the police that DeBerry was armed, and it appears from the facts before us that the weapon was not in plain view.
I do not agree that this case would necessarily come out the same way if Illinois law, like the law of many states, authorized the carrying of concealed weapons.
At that point, the entire content of the anonymous tip would be a physical description of the individual, his location, and an allegation that he was carrying something lawful (a cellular telephone? a beeper? a firearm?).
This kind of nonincriminatory allegation, in my view, would not be enough to justify the kind of investigatory stop that took place here.
On September 8, 2009, Federal District Judge Bruce D. Black, issued an order previously examined here, that concluded as a matter of law that Alamogordo police officiers violated Matthew St. John's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment because they seized and disarmed him even though there was not "any reason to believe that a crime was afoot." Judge Black's opinion is consistent with numerous high state and federal appellate court rulings, including the United States Supreme Court, holding that there is no firearms exception to the Fourth Amendment. St. John v. McColley, et al., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL 2949302 (D.N.M. 2009)
This section authorizes officers to demand identification only when a person is suspected of committing a crime, but does not govern the lawfulness of requests for identification in other circumstances. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72, 98-0931.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1226046509410140751&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
52 F.3d 194 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Coye Denise GREEN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 94-1675. United States Court of App
Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600 - Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 4th Dist. 2009
"Despite the obvious potential danger to officers and the public by a person in possession of a concealed gun in a crowd, this is not illegal in Florida unless the person does not have a concealed weapons permit, a fact that an officer cannot glean by mere observation. Based upon our understanding of both Florida and United States Supreme Court precedent, stopping a person solely on the ground that the individual possesses a gun violates the Fourth Amendment."
In evaluating the validity of investigatory stops, we must consider the "totality of the circumstances--the whole picture." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Reasonable suspicion must derive from more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Moreover, "[c]onduct typical of a broad category of innocent people provides a weak basis for suspicion." United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Crawford, 891 F.2d 680, 681 (8th Cir.1989)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 829, 121 L.Ed.2d 699 (1992).
A number of the factors relied upon by Carrill can be characterized as "conduct typical of a broad category of innocent people." Weaver, 966 F.2d at 394. We reject the notion that Green's travelling alone, carrying a small bag, wearing new and baggy clothes, and failing to make eye contact with Carrill, are in any way indicative of criminal activity. Thus, these factors cannot play a role in assessing the validity of the investigatory stop.
Under Florida v. J.L., an anonymous tip giving rise to reasonable suspicion must bear indicia of reliability. That the tipster's anonymity is placed at risk indicates that the informant is genuinely concerned and not a fallacious prankster. Corroborated aspects of the tip also lend credibility; the corroborated actions of the suspect need be inherently criminal in and of themselves., 2001 WI 21, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106, 96-1821. State v. Williams
An anonymous tip is not RAS
ID'ing yourself discussion
