BB62
Accomplished Advocate
Adam Seaton is 18, and his friend is 23....I believe both people involved in the Riverside 'payday' stop are in their 20's...
Adam Seaton is 18, and his friend is 23....I believe both people involved in the Riverside 'payday' stop are in their 20's...
That is the one I addressed in my earlier post. No strawmen, please.The Lorain open carrier is 24 ...
Serious answer: This is not the operation of a motor vehicle. Did I mention: No strawmen, please?A person may start driving at age 16 in Ohio.
How many 16 and 17-year-olds are stopped JUST for 'looking too young'?
How many 18 to 20-year-olds are stopped JUST for 'looking too young'?
Serious questions.
"We are mindful of Brooklyn’s right to enforce its curfew laws, and we do not fault the police for detaining Kaczor under the circumstances. Police may reasonably suspect and detain someone for being out past curfew." Brooklyn v. Kaczor, 2013-Ohio-2901, at ¶13 (8th Dist.)
What would a trial judge say at a suppression hearing? What would an appellate judge say?"[T]he officer saw a group of individuals who appeared to be young in age walking in the street rather than on the sidewalk at 1:15 a.m. He recognized one member of the group and knew that individual to be under the age of 18 and therefore out after curfew. When the group saw the officer, they began walking away at a fast pace. The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the group and investigate further." State v. Wise, 2010-Ohio-2040, at ¶18. (5th Dist.)
That is the one I addressed in my earlier post. No strawmen, please.
Serious answer: This is not the operation of a motor vehicle. Did I mention: No strawmen, please?
This case involves a person walking on the street with an openly carried rifle. This is that person:
View attachment 11387*
Officer at Suppression Hearing: "I saw the youth walking down the street, alone and carrying a rifle slung on his back. I suspected that he was under eighteen years of age, and that he had been provided that firearm unlawfully, or that he had unlawfully acquired the firearm on his own. I stopped the youth and asked him to identify himself to determine if he was old enough to possess the firearm without adult supervision."
Consider similar Ohio case law:
What would a trial judge say at a suppression hearing? What would an appellate judge say?
* Image publish pursuant to Fair Use, 17 U.S.C. §107.
No, the cop guessed, had a gut feeling, nothing but a mere hunch, a hope if you will.<snip>
Officer at Suppression Hearing: "I saw the youth walking down the street, alone and carrying a rifle slung on his back. I suspected that he was under eighteen years of age, and that he had been provided that firearm unlawfully, or that he had unlawfully acquired the firearm on his own. I stopped the youth and asked him to identify himself to determine if he was old enough to possess the firearm without adult supervision."
Then I must be unreasonable, or blind, because I do not, these days, base my age determination of another citizen on mere "looks." That cop did though. He attempts to justify his guess based on a bias that the dude looks younger than what that cop thought a armed adult should look like.Reasonable person could believe this kid is under 18
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And you could argue that, and you could stomp your feet and scream it, but you don't make that call. A trial judge, who will sit face-to-face with the young fellow, will make that decision. And in the absence of an abuse of discretion, an appellate judge will uphold the trial judge on findings of facts, specifically, how old the person appears to be. Once a reasonable suspicion of less-than-18 is established, the lawful explanations of him walking down the street, alone and with an AK-47, is limited.No, the cop guessed, had a gut feeling, nothing but a mere hunch, a hope if you will.
Other than seeing a gun, the only observable fact, and not unlawful in and of it self at that point it seems. The cop observing a "young-looking" dude, that cop cobbled together all those possible crimes from one observable fact and a desire to find a <18 year old in possession of that gun.
The cop gets a pass because what a citizen looks like, in his opinion, is RAS.And you could argue that, and you could stomp your feet and scream it, but you don't make that call. A trial judge, who will sit face-to-face with the young fellow, will make that decision. And in the absence of an abuse of discretion, an appellate judge will uphold the trial judge on findings of facts, specifically, how old the person appears to be. Once a reasonable suspicion of less-than-18 is established, the lawful explanations of him walking down the street, alone and with an AK-47, is limited.
This may contravene your narrative and your near-religious convictions on the subject matter, but that doesn't make it any less the truth. Wishing doesn't make it so.
And if that opinion is reasonable under the circumstances, and if he articulates it adequately at a suppression hearing, it constitutes a reasonable articulable suspicion.The cop gets a pass because what a citizen looks like, in his opinion, is RAS.
If reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, the Fourth Amendment is not violated, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped that person absent some additional law enforcement objective. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).This case is not about the citizen who looks <18, it is about a cop who sees a gun, and he then manufacturing RAS of a crime, where no other facts are evident, is based only on the appearance of the citizen with the gun. This is dangerous ground and a pattern can be easily established that the gun is the only reason for the stop. Unless of course the gun is all the RAS the cop needs and the age issue is the determining factor, after the fact, as to whether or not a crime is being committed.
Agree. To do otherwise in those circumstances indicates a predisposition to the concept of a "free lunch."And if that opinion is reasonable under the circumstances, and if he articulates it adequately at a suppression hearing, it constitutes a reasonable articulable suspicion.
If reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, the Fourth Amendment is not violated, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped that person absent some additional law enforcement objective. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Now, in all fairness, this will always be case-specific, and the truth is, based on their individual appearances, 24-year-old Mr. Septaric in Lorain is more likely to appear under the age of eighteen than is 18-year-old Mr. Seaton in Dayton, with his neo-Elvis sideburns and all. That's why the carry-a-gun-and-refuse-ID game is best not played by youngsters.
Whren is not the case you should cite. Prouse is a better case to determine reasonableness. Whren even cites Prouse on that issue.And if that opinion is reasonable under the circumstances, and if he articulates it adequately at a suppression hearing, it constitutes a reasonable articulable suspicion.
If reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, the Fourth Amendment is not violated, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped that person absent some additional law enforcement objective. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Now, in all fairness, this will always be case-specific, and the truth is, based on their individual appearances, 24-year-old Mr. Septaric in Lorain is more likely to appear under the age of eighteen than is 18-year-old Mr. Seaton in Dayton, with his neo-Elvis sideburns and all. That's why the carry-a-gun-and-refuse-ID game is best not played by youngsters.
And if that opinion is reasonable under the circumstances, and if he articulates it adequately at a suppression hearing, it constitutes a reasonable articulable suspicion.
If reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, the Fourth Amendment is not violated, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped that person absent some additional law enforcement objective. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), is exactly the case I should cite, and it is the one that you seem desperate to disavow. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), stands for the proposition that a stop cannot be made without reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Whren stands for the proposition that if reasonable suspicion exists - even if it is just a reasonable suspicion that the person in possession of a firearm is an unsupervised juvenile - then a stop is justified, even if the officer has other motives for making the stop. You may not like that part, but it's still the law.Whren is not the case you should cite. Prouse is a better case to determine reasonableness. Whren even cites Prouse on that issue.
Whoa! You need to roll back and realize what we're talking about. Septaric was not arrested; he was not charged; there was no suppression hearing; "the cop" made no such claim; and a judge made no ruling on the same. This is about a statement of a training officer at Lorain County Community College that, "he has reasonable suspicion to stop you and to make sure that you're old enough to have the firearm." My point is that Septaric looks young enough (that's why I posted his image) to allow the officer to make that argument, and even if the officer had other motives to stop him, the reasonable suspicion regarding his age is sufficient to justify the stop, regardless of the other motives. You may not like that, but there are many things in this life that some of us don't like, but we need to know how to adapt to them.There was no criminality in evidence. That cop claims the citizen is underage without any facts to substantiate his claim ...
I see. Whren did not revolve around "other motives" but PC for a stop due to a observed traffic violation, no turn signal. But this seems to be minutia at this point. The premise that appearance alone is reasonable suspicion is problematic for me. But, this is my problem.Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), is exactly the case I should cite, and it is the one that you seem desperate to disavow. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), stands for the proposition that a stop cannot be made without reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Whren stands for the proposition that if reasonable suspicion exists - even if it is just a reasonable suspicion that the person in possession of a firearm is an unsupervised juvenile - then a stop is justified, even if the officer has other motives for making the stop. You may not like that part, but it's still the law.
I see, again. I was stuck on the below in a previous post of yours.Whoa! You need to roll back and realize what we're talking about. Septaric was not arrested; he was not charged; there was no suppression hearing; "the cop" made no such claim; and a judge made no ruling on the same. This is about a statement of a training officer at Lorain County Community College that, "he has reasonable suspicion to stop you and to make sure that you're old enough to have the firearm." My point is that Septaric looks young enough (that's why I posted his image) to allow the officer to make that argument, and even if the officer had other motives to stop him, the reasonable suspicion regarding his age is sufficient to justify the stop, regardless of the other motives. You may not like that, but there are many things in this life that some of us don't like, but we need to know how to adapt to them.
I did not connect the dots to a training officer's opinion and what appeared to me, incorrectly now, as a excerpt form a court case. Dangerous ground if looks = RAS. If a gun is not RAS, where it is not, then looks cannot be RAS. I'll get over it. Thanks for the clarifications.This case involves a person walking on the street with an openly carried rifle. This is that person:
Officer at Suppression Hearing: "I saw the youth walking down the street, alone and carrying a rifle slung on his back. I suspected that he was under eighteen years of age, and that he had been provided that firearm unlawfully, or that he had unlawfully acquired the firearm on his own. I stopped the youth and asked him to identify himself to determine if he was old enough to possess the firearm without adult supervision."