Futher Thoughts
Quite possibly. I just haven't read any cases where the court used this type of test. And the part of Hamdan test weighing the interests of the state vs. individual is the most problematic. Showing that concealment was the only practical alternative and that you had no criminal intent (even though it is the prosecution's burden to prove the opposite) is relatively easy.
Have there been such cases?
Doesn't the Fisher case perform the experiment? It is post-Sec. 25 and post-Hamdan. The only difference between Fisher and your scenario is that a gun on the seat (encased or not) would not be considered concealed while a gun in the glovebox was concealed. If Fisher had left the gun exposed (and the Walls definition of concealed were overturned), he would have been convicted.
941.23 - ANNOT.
This section is constitutional as applied in this case. The defendant's interest in exercising his right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security by carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle does not substantially outweigh the state's interest in prohibiting him from carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle. State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495, 04-2989.
Thanks for the input. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of any case, I think we've put together the most likely arguments (on either side).
ok, I'll take a chance.
I don't know if these words or ideas were from the Hamden case or another since 1998. But I believe one of the statements in the decision basically said that "since there was no alternative" the person had "no other choice to do what was done". Since Art 1, sec 25 allowed a person to keep and bear arms for defense and security, and there was no criminal intent, a person who is doing the best they can to obey the law(s) should be in the clear. I drive a small pickup and every place in the cab is within reach. If I place the gun, encased and unloaded, on the front seat, I am clearly not hiding it. If I were to get stopped for traffic violation and the officer saw the gun case, he/she would assume there is a firearm in the vehicle and probably ask me to step out of the car. I would do so, but lock the car behind me. If I try to have a gun out of reach, I would have to leave the gun at home and my right to defense and security is in effect being denied. My choice to drive is an option, but I don't think I need to walk, carrying my handgun on my hip, 8 miles to town to make sure I am exercising my right.
If Art 1, sec 25 had not been passed, there would be no "fall-back position", but there again, if I drove my truck, there would be no alternative.
If there is a passenger on the front seat, the unloaded and encased handgun goes behind the seat. As Shotgun has said, ready access to my gun is denied because I have to get the case, remove the gun, and load it. Not having ready access is important.
Quite possibly. I just haven't read any cases where the court used this type of test. And the part of Hamdan test weighing the interests of the state vs. individual is the most problematic. Showing that concealment was the only practical alternative and that you had no criminal intent (even though it is the prosecution's burden to prove the opposite) is relatively easy.
Court cases have set some criteria for legal acts, but the Keith and Walls decisions did not have Art 1,sec 25 for any defense. Hamden did have it as part of the defense, and the decision reflected it.
I am not a lawyer. I am only trying to reason out the situation as logically as I can given the information available to me. I know, logic is not a defense. Maybe we should take this to a Vulcan court.
The fact that no one has been convicted of a crime when a handgun was unloaded and encased and on the front seat must be meaningful. It is not a game of chance anymore. Years of precedent have been set under the same conditions.
Have there been such cases?
In Hamden, the justices said that 941.23 was unworkable in light Art 1 Sec 25. A gedanken experiment (or even a test case) would be to carry a loaded gun in a vehicle for the purpose of security or defense and be arrested for such violation. Is Art 1, Sec 25 strong enough on it's own to support a defense? I don't know (and I am not going to try it). All through history, the WI courts have tried to balance the "security of the person" and personal rights, with the "security of the state". The trump card in the past has been that the state had the stronger argument to maintain civil security and the individual right suffered.
One could also apply the logic to the State Park, GFSZ, etc but if choices can be made by the individual to not break the law(s) without giving up the right, then defense weakens.
Doesn't the Fisher case perform the experiment? It is post-Sec. 25 and post-Hamdan. The only difference between Fisher and your scenario is that a gun on the seat (encased or not) would not be considered concealed while a gun in the glovebox was concealed. If Fisher had left the gun exposed (and the Walls definition of concealed were overturned), he would have been convicted.
941.23 - ANNOT.
This section is constitutional as applied in this case. The defendant's interest in exercising his right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security by carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle does not substantially outweigh the state's interest in prohibiting him from carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle. State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495, 04-2989.
One can even extend the argument to open carry. Is a person's right to open carry stronger than the state's obligation to "keep the peace" (therefore DC)? The State AG certainly alluded to the personal right being stronger in the absence of any criminal activity.
(I am also remembering the Jackson Co. DA and the Clark Co. judge.)
I don't think these arguments are new, but you asked for it. ok, I've rambled enough. There may be a sequel.
Thanks for the input. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of any case, I think we've put together the most likely arguments (on either side).