Multiple sources:
"
58 percent of GOP not sure/doubt Obama born in US
Shocker poll from Kos/Research2000 today.
A whopping 58 percent of Republicans either think Barack Obama wasn't born in the US (28 percent) or aren't sure (30 percent). A mere 42 percent think he was.
That means a majority of Republicans polled either don't know about -- or don't believe the seemingly incontrovertible evidence Obama's camp has presented over and over and over that he was born in Hawaii in '61."
http://www.politico.com/blogs/glennthrush/0709/58_of_GOP_not_suredont_beleive_Obama_born_in_US.html
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"Dixie may once have been the so-called land of cotton, but it has become the cradle of creeping Birtherism. According to
a new poll from Research 2000 (commissioned by Daily Kos), a majority of Southerners either believe that Barack
[COLOR=#005497 !important][COLOR=#005497 !important]Obama[/COLOR][/COLOR] was not born in the United States (23 percent) or are not sure (30 percent). Only 47 percent of Southern respondents believe Obama was born in the USA. By contrast, 93 percent of Northeasterns said yes, he was born here, 90 percent of Midwesterners did and 87 percent of Westerners.
Wow.
And while 93 percent of Democrats say he was born in the country and 83 percent of
[COLOR=#005497 !important][COLOR=#005497 !important]Independents[/COLOR][/COLOR], the figure is only 42 percent for Republicans. A majority of Republicans either believe he was born abroad (28 percent) or don't know (30 percent)."
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs...erners-republicans-question-obama-citizenship
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/birther-polls-unite-obama_n_855135.html
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Wou
Cite for proof. If you aren't "innept".
ldn
I don't have to, it's called an opinion.t attack Grammar but after stating how "innept" someone is, you should probably focus on your typing skills. Now Beretta will reply with how I pointed out her grammar and whine and snivel about that after she made herself look like an ass with that comment.
Pstt, you do know that military leaders can make calls without his approval yes?
"Making calls," and ordering assassination are not the same 'thing'. Yes, the military are generally allowed to make calls without approval. But assassination is a totally different 'thing'. I should mention that I think it is interesting that Bin Laden's death is not referred to as an "assassination." Bin Laden is the leader of a worldwide Organization, and what did occur was an assassination.
I see, so given the issue that I was referencing, you are stating that the military can order that Bin Laden be killed? Funny, I was under the impression that the President could only order the military into pakistan, and whether or not someone is to be killed (refer below).
I would appreciate you citing where military officials below the President are authorized, without the President, to order assassination. As well as military officials are able to order crossing into a sovreign State without the order of the President.
Cite that President Obama personally made the call
""This was a kill operation," the official said, making clear there was no desire to try to capture bin Laden alive in
Pakistan."
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-binladen-kill-idUSTRE7413H220110502
Unless someone else is President of the United States, then it must have been President Obama. Only Obama can authorize military persons to move into Pakistan. If I am wrong, cite it.
You know me, just some 'liberal' who you assert doesn't know what they are talking about. A little reading material for you, Slow. Study-up, there will be a test in the morning!
Nice try though:
"1.1
Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal."
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html#1.1
http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/schools/law/lawreviews/journals/bciclr/26_1/01_TXT.htm
"C. Executive Order 12333 and Schultz’s “Active Defense”
In 1981, President Reagan issued the most recent version of the ban, Executive Order 12333. This new Order, which remains in effect today, retained President Carter’s wording, but added a section that prohibits indirect assassination by members of the intelligence community.
153 It was the Reagan administration’s use of force in response to terrorism, however, not the minor revisions in the Order itself, that proved to be more significant. On April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force F-111 fighter-bombers struck three targets in Libya in retaliation for a Libyan-plotted terrorist attack at a Berlin nightclub that had killed a U.S. servicemen and wounded over two hundred others. One of these targets, the El Azziziya Barracks, was reportedly known by American intelligence to be the home and headquarters of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Although he was not present at the time of the attack, his wife and two sons were injured, and his young adopted daughter was killed.
154
Press scrutiny of the raid revealed considerable evidence suggesting that the attack was intended to kill Qadhafi.
155 The strike targets were close to his tent—which was in the corner of a very large open [*PG25]courtyard
156—and the United States supposedly sought intelligence on his location right up until the night of the attack.
157 According to reporter Seymour Hersh, nine of the eighteen bombers employed in the raid had a specific mission to target Qadhafi and his family.
158 As one Air Force intelligence officer put it: “There’s no question they were looking for Qadhafi. It was briefed that way. They were going to kill him.”
159 Additionally, administration officials were instructed before the raid to prepare briefs that distinguished how Qadhafi’s hypothetical death in the pending attack was not an assassination.
160 Furthermore, language announcing his demise was reportedly prepared for the President’s speech that evening.
161
In response to these accusations, the Reagan administration argued that the raid did not violate Executive Order 12333, and strenuously denied that Qadhafi was even a target. “We weren’t out to kill anybody,” said the President, although he doubted that “any of us would have shed tears” if Qadhafi had indeed died.
162 Meanwhile, senior administration officials hastily categorized the raid as a legitimate Article 51 self-defense operation to the United Nations, sharing U.S. intelligence which conclusively linked Libya to the Berlin attack and revealed that as many as thirty more attacks were being planned.
163
While the State Department invoked Article 51 to satisfy international law, White House legal counsel Abraham D. Sofaer argued that the strike fell within a loophole in Executive Order 12333. Qadhafi was not a target of the raids, Sofaer reasoned, but if he merely happened to be present at one of the facilities that was bombed, his death would not be an assassination—just a consequence of the raid.
164 A leader’s position, Sofaer opined, does not legally immunize him from the effects of being present at a valid military target that is being attacked.
165 Effectively, this reasoning reflected the law of armed conflict as it applies to non-combatants
166—a legitimate defense if [*PG26]there was indeed a state of armed conflict or a continuing threat against the United States that merited a preemptive act of self-defense.
Secretary of State George Schultz, who had openly complained that the United States had responded to terrorism by becoming “the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond,”
167 strongly supported this argument. In a public address, he asserted the U.S. government would have to prepare an “active defense” to counter the rise in terrorism the future would bring.
168 His statements were more than mere rhetoric—they were a glimpse of a persistent policy trend that would remain through the next three presidential administrations. Secretary Schultz predicted, “We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.”
169 What is needed to undermine the growing threat of terrorism, Secretary Schultz proposed, was a doctrine of active interventionsm:
We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, pre-emption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents of terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps towards carrying out those measures. There should be no moral confusion on the issue. Our aim is not to seek revenge but to put an end to violent attacks against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to live for all of us. Clearly the democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.
170
In his remarks, Secretary Schultz also stated that there were cases where international rules and traditional practices did not apply, and that the free nations cannot afford to let the “Orwellian corruption of language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, our interests, and our friends.”
171
[*PG27]D. Post Cold War: From Saddam to September 11
Although the Cold War was not yet over, the Libyan raid became the model military action and legal precedent upon which many post-cold war attacks would be based. The lines between formal war and peace were no longer clear—the United States had indicated its intent to use deadly force against foreign leaders, even in peacetime, should they pose a threat to the nation. The use of more overt methods such as an airstrike, however, marked a shift away from the cloak-and-dagger schemes of the Cold War. Instead of covertly working to end a leader’s life, America would strike openly, with gun camera footage visible to all on CNN the next day.
This strategy was to be employed against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. As part of the air campaign leading up to the ground war, coalition strike aircraft hit 580 command and control sites from which Saddam might control his forces and another 260 “leadership targets” that included his palaces and other buildings he was known to frequent.
172 Publicly, senior American leaders continued to deny that Saddam was an official target of the campaign. General Norman Schwartzkopf stated repeatedly that the United States does not “have a policy of trying to kill any particular individual,”
173 but President George Bush was more ambivalent: “We’re not in the position of targeting Saddam Hussein,” he commented, “but no one will weep for him when he is gone.”
174 Administration officials were so sensitive to the suggestion that they were targeting Saddam that Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney fired Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan, who had the poor judgment to boast that the United States would “‘decapitate’ Iraqi leadership by targeting Saddam, his family, and even his mistress.”
175
After the war, however, individual generals were more forthcoming. General Charles Horner, the Commander of the U.S. Ninth Air Force and one of the major engineers of the air war, was quoted as saying, “As a matter of policy we were not trying to assassinate [Saddam] but we dropped bombs on every place that he should have been at work . . . that’s . . . getting kind of fancy with words but in reality [*PG28]that’s the truth of the matter.”
176 The General continued by explaining that U.S. aircraft were actively hunting down the Winnebagos the Iraqi dictator was using as mobile command posts.
177 On one occasion, one of Hussein’s groups of Winnebagos was reportedly attacked by U.S. A-10 strike aircraft, which destroyed several vehicles but narrowly missed the dictator himself.
178 Although Horner’s comments belie his lack of understanding of the laws of war as they apply to assassination, these attacks were nonetheless perfectly legal. Open strikes by cruise missiles and bombers against Saddam, a combatant in his role as the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi Army, were neither treacherous nor outlawry, and thus were valid. Furthermore, under international law, the coalition’s UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, the Iraqi armed invasion of Kuwait, and the Iraqi abduction of over 3,500 American hostages, add more legal legitimacy to the United States’ claims that the war was a valid self-defense action on behalf of Kuwait. Additionally, even if Saddam had been killed by one of these raids, it would not be an assassination under Executive Order 12333, as the attacks fell under President Reagan’s exception for strikes against valid military targets.
The Clinton administration employed airstrikes and cruise missiles more frequently than its predecessors to strike directly at foreign leaders. President Clinton used force against Saddam several times, first in 1993, when he employed a barrage of Tomahawk missiles to destroy Iraqi intelligence headquarters in retaliation for a plot to kill former President George Bush.
179 Then, in 1998, Clinton struck at the dictator with air raids for forcing weapons inspectors out of Iraq. Administration officials commented at the time that the “candles” their predecessors had supposedly lit during the Gulf War in hopes that Saddam Hussein would be killed would be lit again.
180 As one official put it, “command and control sites will be targeted and we hope Saddam Hussein is in one of them.”
181 A year later, the U.S. Air Force also bombed the home of Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic—des[*PG29]ignated a “command and control” target by NATO—during the 1999 Kosovo campaign.
182
However, certainly the greatest effort to kill a specific individual has been directed toward Usama bin Laden. This former Saudi national has been on the United States’ “most wanted” list since 1996 when information linked him to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. A
fatwa, or religious edict, issued by bin Laden in 1998 which urged all Muslims to kill Americans, and his subsequent involvement in the attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in August of 1998, the attack against the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the September 11, 2001 attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have made him the target of a wide range of lethal operations.
The Clinton administration struck out at bin Laden and his organization several times, and amended Executive Order 12333 to make this task easier. First, in 1998 President Clinton removed from the Order’s scope the death of a foreign leader that results from a counterterror operation.
183 He then authorized the use of deadly force against bin Laden and his al-Qa’ida organization—with the understanding that bin Laden might not survive the campaign.
184 Clinton opted not to strike directly at bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan with a risky helicopter raid, choosing instead to bombard them with some 60 cruise missiles.
185 However, the Tomahawks reportedly missed bin Laden by perhaps as little as two to three hours.
186 By the end of his term, Clinton’s initial timidity had hardened into a greater dedicated resolve, and he became more willing to take more risks to eliminate bin Laden. In 1999, press reports suggest he authorized the CIA to train and equip some 60 Pakistani commandos to enter Afghanistan and either capture or kill bin Laden.
187 However, the over[*PG30]throw of Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif by a military coup in 1999 reportedly forced an indefinite suspension of the operation.
188
The newly elected George W. Bush administration added dramatically to its predecessors’ efforts to eliminate bin Laden as a threat to national security and adopted his elimination as a consuming goal of the new Bush presidency after September 11th. In Mid-September of 2001, President Bush, supported by a Joint Resolution of Congress authorizing him to employ “all necessary and appropriate force,”
189 issued an intelligence finding—an order dictating the use of funds appropriated for covert actions.
190 The finding further authorized the CIA to attack bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida organization. The President specifically directed that al-Qa’ida communications, security apparatus, and infrastructure be targeted with the assistance of covert action teams from the U.S. military.
191 The President’s intelligence finding authorized the CIA to employ deadly force to achieve these objectives, and as one senior Bush official put it, “The gloves are off. . . . [L]ethal operations that were unthinkable pre-September 11 are now underway.”
192 Although the finding does not specifically exempt the government from complying with Executive Order 12333, the Clinton exception for counterterror operations would no longer categorize bin Laden’s death, should it arise from these covert actions, as an assassination under Executive Order 12333. Targeting bin Laden, the head of al-Qa’ida’s chain of command and the engineer of a string of terrorist attacks, would be legal as an Article 51 self-defense action against an imminent threat to the United States’ national security. His death would not therefore be an assassination unless it resulted from one of the methods expressly prohibited by the laws of war. Only Bush’s own suggestion that bin Laden was “wanted, dead or alive,” strays dangerously close to those prohibited means of killing. Were the statement more than just a figure of speech, it would constitute outlawry, rendering any resulting deaths as assassination under international law.
[*PG31] Since the drafting of Executive Order 12333 in the 1970s, the United States has refrained from applying deadly force against foreign leadership except in times of war, near war, or imminent threat against the nation. And even when such force was applied, the United States has typically employed direct and overt means, such as airstrikes or cruise missile attacks. Whether America’s new determination to eliminate threats by more unconventional means is merely a unique response to September 11 or marks a return toward the Cold War practices that gave rise to Executive Order 12333 remains to be seen. Although such covert attacks might be illegal in the absence of provocation, in the light of the continuing terrorist threat a state-sponsored killing of Usama bin Laden or other terrorist figures would be justifiable as an Article 51 action, as well as permissible under established exceptions to Executive Order 12333."
I almost forgot - there is this 'thing' called the Constitution of the United States:
"
Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States"
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html#A2Sec1
Apparently the Constitution states that the President is Commander in Chief. Go figure you would ask me a question regarding the Constitution LOL.